RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN FEDERAL COLLATERAL
ATTACK PROCEEDINGS: SECTION 2255
Twenty-four years ago the Supreme Court handed down the now famous
decision of Johnson v. Zerbst.' Noting that the accused "requires the guiding
hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him," the Court
concluded that: "The Sixth Amendment withholds from federal courts, in all
criminal proceedings, the power and authority to deprive an accused of his
life or liberty unless he has or waives the assistance of counsel." 2 In Johnson
v. United States3 and Ellis v. United States,4 per curiam opinions written in
1957 and 1958, the right to counsel was extended to federal criminal appeals.
The recent decision in Coppedge v. United States5 indirectly reaffirmed that
extension.
Although the Supreme Court has upheld the right to counsel for criminal
trials and appeals in the federal courts, it has not yet decided whether the
right exists in a third substantial area of federal criminal litigation: the collateral attack proceedings under section 2255 of the Judicial Code6 and the
7
habeas corpus statutes.
1304 U.s. 458 (1938).
2 Id. at 463. The Court used the word "proceedings" instead of the amendment term
"prosecutions," which indicates that it might have been fixing an interpretation of the
amendment that would include proceedings beyond the trial stage.
Four years after Johnson v. Zerbst, in Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942), a divided Court
refused to extend the Johnson v. Zerbst rule to criminal prosecutions in the state courts,
adopting instead a "fundamental fairness" test to determine the prisoner's right to counsel
when tried under state law. However, the Betts v. Brady fairness test, a source of almost
continuous litigation at the Supreme Court level since its inception, was recently overruled
in Gideon v. Wainwright, 83 Sup.Ct. 792 (1963), by a unanimous Court. While the Gideon
Court agreed with the assumption in Betts v. Brady "that a provision of the Bill of Rights
which is 'fundamental and essential to a fair trial' is made obligatory upon the States by
the Fourteenth Amendment," it held that the Court in Betts v. Brady was wrong "in concluding that the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of counsel is not one of these fundamental
rights." Id. at 795. For a complete discussion of the right to counsel in state criminal proceedings, see Kamisar, The Right to Counsel and the Fourteenth Amendment: A Dialogue
on "the Most Pervasive Right" of an Accused, 30 U. Cm. L. REV. 1 (1962).
3 352 U.S. 565 (1957).
4 356 U.S. 674 (1958).
5 369 U.S. 438 (1962) (5-2 decision). Some gaps still remain in the appellate procedure,
such as the interim period between conviction and appointment of appeal counsel, when
the indigent prisoner is often left to his own devices to get necessary papers filed in time to
maintain appellate privileges. See Boskey, The Right to Counsel in Appellate Proceedings,
45 MINN. L. REv. 783 (1961).

628 U.S.C. § 2255 (1958):
"A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established by Act of Congress claiming
the right to be released upon the ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of the
Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to
[Footnote 6 continued on p. 5841

7 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-52 (1958).
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The circuit courts have frequently considered the question of the right to
counsel in section 2255 proceedings since the statute was added to the Judicial

Code in 1948. The majority rule appears to be that there is no such right.
However, a number of courts follow the view that the right is contingent upon
the nature of the issues raised by the motion. Furthermore, one case may suggest that there is an absolute right to counsel in all section 2255 proceedings.8
The diversity of these rules and their rationales indicates the desirability of a
unifying decision on the question.
The object of this comment is to examine the lines of circuit court decisions
with a view toward determining: (1) Which rule is more consonant with
concepts of fair criminal procedure, and (2) whether the refusal to extend the
right to counsel to include section 2255 proceedings can be justified in view
of the Supreme Court's application of the right in other federal criminal

litigation.
Section 2255 motions to vacate sentence are, by the terms of the statute,
either substitutes for, or required preliminary actions to, habeas corpus pro-

ceedings. 9 They therefore currently give rise to much of the collateral attack
[Footnote 6 continued]

impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by
law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack, may move the court which imposed the
sentence to vacate, set aside, or correct the sentence.
"A motion for such relief may be made at any time.
"Unless the motion and the files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief, the court shall cause notice thereof to be served upon the United
States attorney, grant a prompt hearing thereon, determine the issues and make findings
of fact and conclusions of law with respect thereto. If the court finds that the judgment was
rendered without jurisdiction, or that the sentence imposed was not authorized by law or
otherwise open to collateral attack, or that there has been such a denial or infringement
of the constitutional rights of the prisoner as to render the judgment vulnerable to collateral
attack, the court shall vacate and set the judgment aside and shall discharge the prisoner
or resentence him or grant a new trial or correct the sentence as may appear appropriate.
"A court may entertain and determine such motion without requiring the production
of the prisoner at the hearing.
"The sentencing court shall not be required to entertain a second or successive motion
for similar relief on behalf of the same prisoner.
"An appeal may be taken to the court of appeals from the order entered on the motion
as from a final judgment on application for a writ of habeas corpus.
"An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a prisoner who is authorized
to apply for relief by motion pursuant to this section, shall not be entertained if it appears
that the applicant has failed to -apply for relief, by motion, to the court which sentenced
him, or that such court has denied him relief, unless it also appears that the remedy by
motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention."
s United States v. Paglia, 190 F.2d 445 (2d Cir. 1951). See text accompanying notes 72-73
infra.
9 See note 6 supra, seventh paragraph, and the discussion of the section in Hayman
v. United States, 342 U.S. 205, 210-20 (1952); Parker, Limiting the Abuse of Habeas Corpus,
8 F.R.D. 171 (1949). It is because of § 2255's priority position over habeas corpus in
the area of collateral attack that it alone is herein discussed.
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litigation under federal criminal law.10 The problem of right to counsel in this
context arises only in the case of the indigent prisoner, as the courts do not
limit the solvent prisoner's access to his own counsel in the proceedings."
Although section 2255 has no provision concerning the representation of
the prisoner by counsel,' 2 the indigent applicant may petition the court for
appointment of counsel to assist him under the provisions of the federal in
forma pauperis statute. 13 Section 1915(a)14 allows any federal court to authorize the commencement of any action or proceeding or appeal by an indigent
in that court without prepayment of court fees or costs. Section 1915(d)15
states merely that the court "may request" counsel to represent the indigent.
There is no further statutory guarantee that the indigent movant will have the
aid of counsel.16

I

The circuit courts which have held that the indigent prisoner proceeding
under section 2255 has no right to counsel have advanced two basic arguments
in support of their position:
10
"The very purpose of § 2255 is to hold any required hearing in the sentencing court
because of the inconvenience of transporting court officials and other necessary witnesses
to the district of confinement." Hayman v. United States, 342 U.S. 205, 220-21 (1952).
Habeas corpus actions must be brought in the district of confiement. Ahrens v. Clark, 335
U.S. 188 (1948). No figures are available to show how many collateral attack actions have
been brought by way of habeas corpus since § 2255 was enacted. It appears that 538 motions to vacate under § 2255 were commenced in the district courts in the fiscal year 1960.
As of June 30, 1960, 113 motions were pending. 1960 DnacroR oF THE AD.OFFiCE OF ma
U.S. CouRTs ANN. REP. 231, 241.
11 This is also the case in criminal appeals and, of course, in criminal trials.
12 The section deals with the representation of the prisoner at the hearing only insofar
as it states that the court need not require the production of the prisoner at the hearing.
See note 6 supra,fourth paragraph.
13 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (1958), as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (Supp. In, 1962).
14
"Any court of the United States may authorize the commencement, prosecution or
defense of any suit, action or proceeding, civil or criminal, or appeal therein, without prepayment of fees and costs or security therefor, by a person who makes affidavit that he is
unable to pay such costs or give security therefor. Such affidavit shall state the nature of the
action, defense or appeal and affiant's belief that he is entitled to redress.
"An appeal may not be taken in forma pauperis if the trial court certifies in writing that
it is not taken in good faith." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (1958), as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 1915
(Supp. ff, 1962).
15 "The court may request an attorney to represent any such person unable to employ
counsel and may dismiss the case if the allegation of poverty is untrue, or if satisfied that
the action is frivolous or malicious." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (1958), as amended, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(d) (Supp. 1II, 1962).
16 Itought to be noted here that the Supreme Court had the discretionary language of
§ 1915(d), that the court "may request counsel," before it in Johnson v. United States
and Ellis v. United States, since the petitioners for leave to appeal in both of those cases
had invoked the in forma pauperis statute. Although the Court went beyond the terms of
§ 1915(d) to find a right to counsel in both cases, that right applies only to in forma pauperis
appellants.
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(a) The constitutional guarantee of assistance of counsel as provided in
the sixth amendment does not apply to collateral attack actions. 17
(b) The collateral attack action is not a criminal proceeding by nature,
and has in fact been classified as civil in form; therefore standards of
fair criminal procedure do not apply.18
(A) The argument that the sixth amendment guaranteeofcounsel does not apply
to section 2255 proceedings.-The Fourth Circuit in Crowe v. United States,19
the Seventh Circuit in United States v. Caufteld2O and the Tenth Circuit in
Tubbs v. UnitedStates2l have taken the position that there is no constitutional
right to counsel under section 2255 proceedings because the sixth amendment
only provides for assistance of counsel in every criminalprosecution.This position can be supported by taking a strict view of the sixth amendment term
"prosecution." However, it ignores the possible guarantee of counsel embodied in the due process provision of the fifth amendment. It also ignores
the fact that criminal appeals, section 2255 actions and even habeas corpus
procedure as now prescribed by sections 2244-53 of the Judicial Code were
not yet a part of federal law when the Constitution was framed. To read the
sixth amendment term "prosecution" as a limitation on the right to counsel
in the newer federal criminal actions may thus advance an obsolete interpretation and in effect overrule the accomplished extension of the right to counsel
to include criminal appeals.
If section 2255 is placed in proper historical perspective, it would seem to
be highly inconsistent to extend the right to counsel under the sixth amendment
to appeals and withhold it from the section 2255 proceeding because it is not
a "prosecution." The Supreme Court has taken note of the fact that section
2255 creates a remedy in the nature of the ancient writ of error coram nobis.22
Beyond the fact that the statute was enacted to correct specific abuses of habeas
17 Tubbs v. United States, 249 F.2d 37, 38-39 (10th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S.
935 (1958); United States v. Caufleld, 207 F.2d 278, 280 (7th Cir. 1953); Crowe v. United
States, 175 F.2d 799, 801 (4th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 950 (1950); cf. Richardson
v. United States, 199 F.2d 333 (10th Cir. 1952); Green v. United States, 158 F. Supp. 804,
807 (D. Mass.), aff'd, 256 F.2d 483 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 854 (1958).
18 Richardson v. United States, 199 F.2d 333 (10th Cir. 1952); cf. United States v. Caufield, 207 F.2d 278, 280 (7th Cir. 1953).
19 175 F.2d 799, 801 (4th Cir. 1949).
20 207 F.2d 278, 280 (7th Cir. 1953).
21249 F.2d 37, 38-39 (10th Cir. 1957).
22
United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205 (1952). "'This section ... creates a statutory
remedy consisting of a motion before the court where the movant has been convicted. The
remedy is in the nature of, but much broader than coram nobis. The motion remedy basically
covers all situations where the sentence is 'open to collateral attack.' "Id. at 216-17 (quoting
from, a statement by the Judicial Conference Committee on Habeas Corpus Procedure,
which recommended legislation that later became § 2255). "'This section restates, clarifies
and simplifies the procedure in the nature of the ancient writ of error coram nobis.It provides
an expeditious remedy for correcting erroneous sentences without resort to habeas corpus.'"
Id. at 218 (quoting from the Revisers Note to § 2255).
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corpus as a collateral attack action, it seems to have been declaratory of
existing coram nobis criminal case law in the federal courts. 23 As to the history
of the coram nobis writ, which was originally employed primarily in civil
cases, it has been stated that the function of the writ "has not changed from
its earliest use in the sixteenth century until today.... The efficacy of the writ
lies in the fact that it is employed to vacate a judgment of conviction predicated
on an error in fact unknown to the court. Moreover, these errors in fact could
not have been brought to the attention of the appellate court by appeal since
they did not appear in the record." 24 This being a fair summary of the nature
of section 2255, it becomes apparent that the action has an even closer relation
to a prosecution than the direct appeal. On appeal the validity of the trial
court's judgment will be reviewed on the basis of the record. A section 2255
proceeding lies in the trial court, providing opportunity for that tribunal to
make appropriate corrections in its judgment in light of considerations not
before it at the time of the original action.
Crowe, Caufield and Tubbs were all decided before the Supreme Court
handed down its opinions in Johnson v. United States25 and Ellis v. United
States.26 Johnson and Ellis both involved applications for leave to appeal in
forma pauperis which had been denied by the circuit court. In both cases, the
Supreme Court held that leave to appeal was improperly denied, even though
the lower courts had found that the appeals were not taken in good faith
because the indigent petitioners were not afforded sufficient assistance, including help of counsel, in presenting their applications.
If the Johnson and Ellis decisions were based solely upon the sixth amendment, Crowe, Caufield and Tubbs might seem consonant. The Johnson opinion
2
stated that the appellant was entitled to counsel "under" Johnson v. Zerbst, 7
and in reaffirming the right, Ellis cited only Johnson v. United States. The
28
Johnson v. Zerbst decision was specifically based on the sixth amendment.
It is thus a fair argument that Johnson v. United States, on its face, stands only
for the extension of the sixth amendment term "prosecution" to include the
statutorily guaranteed direct appeal from trial. Under this contention, Crowe,
Caufield and Tubbs demonstrate possible grounds for distinguishing the question of right to counsel under section 2255: Since the collateral attack deals
2
3 Parker, supra note 9, at 175. Judge Parker, who served as chairman of the Judicial
Conference Committee on Habeas Corpus Procedure, cites, among other cases, Roberts
v. United States, 158 F.2d 150 (4th Cir. 1946), as support for the proposition.
24
FRANK, CoRm NOBIS 1 (1953). Frank presents a more detailed history of the writ
as it developed at common law. Much of his book is devoted to the use of the writ in New
York since it was accorded full recognition for criminal cases by the New York courts in
the 1940's. It is interesting to note that valid bases for relief under the New York writ
parallel those recognized by the federal courts under § 2255.
27 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
25352 U.S. 565 (1957).
26 356 U.S. 674 (1958).
28

See text accompanying note 2 supra.
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not with guilt but rather with a basic impropriety of the trial itself, it is invalid
to classify such proceedings as an extension of the trial.
It has already been shown that section 2255 actions would seem historically
to be closely related to the original trial. There is a further argument in
answer to the contention that they are not a part of the prosecution. The
concept of "prosecution" is functional; the number of separate steps in
the guilt-determining and sanction-imposing process which are embraced
therein may vary. As the Supreme Court observed in Hamilton v. Alabama,29
what is a prosecution for one purpose of criminal procedure need not be
determinative when the question is the right to counsel. To limit the use of
prosecution to include only the process of determining in the first instance
whether the accused committed the crime tends to ignore the fact that it is
also a function of the trial to determine and impose criminal sanction. In
light of this aspect, any action that tests the fairness of the imposition of
sentence might be viewed as an extension of the trial. Providing a fair means
for reviewing the judgment and sentence apart from the establishment or
admission of guilt is especially desirable in view of the high percentage of
federal criminal convictions that result from guilty pleas.3 0 Just as a conviction
based on illegally seized evidence will be set aside,31 so also is it improper to
convict an accused who pleads guilty because he was coerced or tricked. The
prisoner's only protection against the latter types of conviction in the federal
courts is the collateral attack action.
Both Johnson and Ellis may have been grounded on due process principles
as well as the sixth amendment guarantee of assistance of counsel in the
criminal prosecution. Unfortunately, however, both opinions omit any detailed discussion or justification of their holdings. The Johnson opinion, after
citing Johnson v. Zerbst,32 went on to state that the case would be remanded
to the circuit court because that court "did not assign counsel to assist petitioner," and because petitioner was not assured "adequate means" of presenting his application for leave to appeal.3 3 Since the case involved the right to
trial transcript as well as the right to counsel, it is not clear whether "adequate
means" referred to the supplying of transcript or to the appointment of
29 368 U.S. 52 (1961). The Court quoted from Tomkins v. Missouri, 323 U.S. 485, 489
(1945), a capital case: "The guiding hand of counsel is needed at the trial 'lest the unwary
concede that which only bewilderment or ignorance could justify or pay a penalty which
is greater than the law of the State exacts for the offense which they in fact and in law
committed."' Hamilton v. Alabama, supra, at 54-55. It then went on to find a right to
counsel at arraignment because Alabama law made that procedure an integral part of the
guilt-fixing process.
30
In the fiscal year 1960, of 26,728 criminal convictions in the federal district courts,
24,245 resulted from guilty pleas. 1960 DnracroR OF THE AD. OFFICE OF TE U.S. COURTS

ANN. RaP. 304.
31 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
33

32 304 U.S. 458 (1938).

Johnson v. United States, 352 U.S. 565, 566 (1957).
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counsel. In either case, the reference to adequacy in the appeal proceedings
would appear to draw due process into the decision.
In Ellis, the circuit court had appointed two attorneys to assist petitioner
with his application for leave to appeal, but the Supreme Court found that
the attorneys had filled the role of amici curiae and held that the services
of an advocate were "required." 34 No indication was given as to just what
law required the appointment of an advocate. Johnson said nothing about the
kind of legal assistance that must be afforded, and Ellis did not mention the
sixth amendment guarantee itself. However, the Court's concern seemed to
center around the adequacy of the procedure.
Coppedge v. United States,35 the most recent and exhaustive Supreme Court
opinion dealing with the rights of indigents under federal criminal appeal
procedure, indicates that the Court is strongly moved by considerations of due
process in this area of the law. The primary question before the Court was
the standard to be applied by the lower federal courts in passing upon applications for leave to appeal in forma pauperis. 36 The Court, however, laid down
rules for the lower courts that included directions as to appointment of counsel. The rules are clearly directed at establishing standard fair procedure. A
substantial portion of the opinion deals with the vitality of the need for
37
"prompt, eminently fair and sober criminal law procedures."
It is not inevitable that the question of right to counsel can be resolved
only under the sixth amendment. If guaranteeing counsel under section 2255
would assure a more just criminal procedure system, the concept of due process is broad enough to include such a guarantee. The fact that the proceeding
is not technically a "prosecution" thus becomes irrelevant.
(B) The argument that the section 2255 proceeding is not a criminalaction.InExparteTom Tong,38 the Supreme Court,in determining its own jurisdiction,
held that habeas corpus proceedings are civil actions. 39 In Green v. United
States,40 the section 2255 proceeding was similarly held to be a civil action "for
the purposes of the docket of this Court and of reports to the Administrative
Office of the United States Courts." 41 In United States v. I-ayman,42 the Supreme Court noted in dictum that "unlike the criminal trial where the guilt of
the defendant is in issue.., a proceeding under section 2255 is an independent
and collateral inquiry into the validity of the conviction." 43 This latter position
has been taken by the Seventh Circuit in Caufield44 and by the Tenth Circuit
34 Ellis v. United States, 356 U.S. 674, 675 (1958).
3
35 369 U.S. 438 (1962).
7 Id. at 449.
38 108 U.S. 556 (1883).
36 Id. at 440.
39 Id. at 559-60; cf. Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708, 712 (1961).
40 158 F. Supp. 804 (D. Mass.), aff'd,256 F.2d 483 (1st Cir. 1958).
43 Id. at 222.
4Z 342 U.S. 205 (1952).
41 158 F. Supp. at 806.
44

United States v. Caufleld, 207 F.2d 278, 280 (7th Cir. 1953).
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in Richardson v. United States,45 when holding against the right to counsel.
In addition, one district court 46 and two commentators47 have indicated that
the Hayman dictum is a proper basis for withholding the right.
The Supreme Court, however, recently rejected the "civil" classification
of habeas corpus proceedings as determinative of the prisoner's rights in
those proceedings: "The availability of a procedure to retain liberty lost
through criminal process cannot be made contingent upon a choice of
labels."48 The district court in Green v. United States49 did not accept the
labeling of the section 2255 action as "a special civil rather than a criminal
proceeding" for purposes of determining the prisoner's right to counsel. That
court chose to view the proceeding as "a sort of hybrid."50 The Ninth
Circuit recently conceded that classifying section 2255 actions as "civil" did
not provide a proper basis for denial of right to counsel: "Realistically, a
proceeding which may result in vacating a criminal judgment is, at least, not
purely civil."51
It would be more reasonable to determine the prisoner's rights under
section 2255 in light of the action's implicit criminal nature-its added
protection for the prisoner against the loss of life or liberty through a specifically improper trial or sentence. Conceding that the proceedings are
basically criminal does not, however, remove the possibility that refusal to
extend the right to counsel to those proceedings might be justified because
the nature of the action is such that "the same need for counsel is not invariably present" under section 2255 as in the case of trial or appeal.5 2
In spite of this suggested possibility, it is nowhere demonstrated that aid
of counsel is any less necessary in order for the prisoner to employ section
2255 effectively than it is to assure him of an adequate appeal or trial. This
is particularly significant if the trial court grants the prisoner a hearing on
his motion. Given that the court has determined that the prisoner may have
a valid point to raise,5 3 he is in just as great need of technical assistance in
45 199 F.2d 333 (10th Cir. 1952).
46 Motion of Davis, 92 F. Supp. 524, 526 (D. Mont. 1949).
4

7 Boskey, supra note 5, at 799; Qua, Griffin v. Illinois, 25 U. Cm. L. REv. 143, 149-50

(1957).
48 Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708, 712 (1961).
49 158 F. Supp. 804, 807 (D. Mass.), aff'd, 256 F.2d 483 (1st Cir. 1958).
50158 F. Supp. at 807.
51
Dillon v. United States, 307 F.2d 445, 446 n. 3 (9th Cir. 1962).
52 Ibid.
53 Under § 2255, a hearing must be granted unless the motion, and the files and records
of the case, conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief. See note 6 supra,
third paragraph.
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litigating this point as is the defendant or appellant who by hypothesis also
has an arguable point to make. It is an untenable proposition that the indigent
prisoner will be able to proceed fairly on the strength of his own technical
knowledge in the section 2255 proceeding. The section 2255 motion is a
procedure by which the prisoner may regain liberty lost through the criminal
process. It is just as important that he be guaranteed the effective use of this
collateral attack procedure as it is that he be given adequate assurance that
he will not in the first instance be unfairly deprived of his freedom.
II
If it is conceded that in the interest of fairness and effectiveness the movant
ought to have the assistance of counsel, the question remains as to the possible
limitation upon the furnishing of free aid to the indigent prisoner.
In denying the right to counsel under section 2255, one circuit court has
held, without further justification, that the appointment of counsel for the
indigent prisoner rests within the sound discretion of the trial court.5 4 As
noted previously, section 1915(d) clears the way for such a holding by providing, without specificity, that the court may appoint counsel in proceedings
in forma pauperis.SS
The drawback inherent in leaving appointment of counsel within the discretion of the trial court, without saying more, is that no standards are
advanced by which the trial court can employ its discretion. Similarly, the
appellate courts are left without criteria for considering the possible abuse of
56
the trial court's discretion.
This is not to say, however, that the only conclusion must be that free
allowance of counsel to the indigent prisoner is in order. Such unrestricted
allowance might well lead to abuse at the hands of the poor prisoner who
searches through the prison law books trying to find new ways to regain
freedom. A safeguard against such abuse is undoubtedly necessary, especially
in view of the facts that section 2255 may be invoked at any time while the
prisoner is still in jailS7 and that the same prisoner may file successive motions
so long as they do not seek "similar relief."58
If the trial court is to have discretion as to the appointment of counsel, what
should be the scope of that discretion? The Seventh Circuit has recently
indicated that the trial court is justified in disallowing counsel if the prisoner's
54 Richardson v. United States, 199 F.2d 333 (10th Cir. 1952); cf. Crowe v. United States,
175 F.2d 799, 801 (4th Cir. 1949).
S5See text accompanying notes 14-15 supra.
5
6 Under § 2255, appeals may be taken from a final order on the motion by the trial
court. See note 6 supra, sixth paragraph.
57 Id., first paragraph.
58 Id., fifth paragraph. It is also significant that the number of § 2255 motions filed
and rejected is great.
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motion demonstrates no grounds for relief.5 9 It is submitted that this standard
unduly limits the effectiveness of the indigent prisoner's motion. Without aid
of counsel to assist him in preparing the motion, the indigent will be handicapped in attempting to present one that will demonstrate some right to relief.
To say that the prisoner must first present a valid motion before he may have
assistance tends to say that he must first demonstrate that he does not need
aid before he may receive it.
The Supreme Court handed down its rulings on the right to counsel on
appeal in the face of the discretionary provisions of section 1915(d).60 Those
holdings also ran counter to the terms of section 1915(a) that "an appeal may
not be taken in forma pauperis if the trial court certifies in writing that it is
not taken in good faith." 61 Such certification was entered by the trial courts
in Johnson62 and Coppedge,63 but in both cases the Court remanded to the
circuit court for further proceedings, with counsel representing the prisoner.
Thus, even more specific statutory recognition of trial court discretion than
that embodied in section 1915(d) was disregarded by the Court.
In Coppedge, however, the Supreme Court laid down standards for considering in forma pauperis appeals, that appear to take into account the possibility of the poor prisoner abusing his rights. The circuit courts were instructed:
[I]f from the face of the papers he has filed, it is apparent that the applicant
will present issues for review not clearly frivolous, the Court of Appeals
should then grant leave to appeal... appoint counsel to represent the
appellant and proceed to consideration of the appeal on its merits.... If,
on the other hand, the claims made or the issues sought to be raised by
the applicant are such that their substance cannot adequately be ascertained from the face of the defendant's application, the Court of Appeals
must provide the would-be appellant both with the assistance of counsel
and a record of sufficient completeness to enable him to attempt to make
a showing that the District Court's certificate of lack of "good faith" is in
error and that leave to proceed with the appeal... should be allowed.64
If these rules were carried over to the section 2255 proceedings, they would
plainly give the prisoner an opportunity to advance a valid claim for relief.
Still the trial court would be justified in refusing to consider appointment of
59 Thomas v. United States, 308 F.2d 369 (7th Cir. 1962). Accord, Way v. United States,
200 F. Supp. 539, 540 (D. Colo. 1961); Hayes v. United States, 194 F. Supp. 807 (D. Colo.
1960); United States v. Owens, 186 F. Supp. 653 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); cf. Vinson v. United
States, 235 F.2d 120, 122 (6th Cir. 1956).
60
See note 15 supra.
6
1 See note 14 supra,third paragraph.
62
Johnson v. United States, 352 U.S. 565 (1957).
63 Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438 (1962).

64 Id. at 446.
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counsel when the prisoner's motion was clearly frivolous. An adequate alternative rule might charge the court with considering the motion, files and
records of the case and allow it to refuse counsel only when those records
together showed conclusively that the prisoner was entitled to no relief. This
rule is already prescribed by section 2255 as the standard by which the trial
court must determine whether to grant a hearing on the motion.65 It differs
from the Coppedge rule for appeals only in that it places the burden of
searching the records upon the court instead of the court-appointed attorney.
Any broader use of the trial court's discretion to disallow counsel, such as
basing disallowance on the uncounselled prisoner's motion alone, would seem
undesirably to limit the effectiveness of section 2255 for the indigent. 66
A standard such as was set forth in Coppedge to determine whether counsel
should be appointed to represent the indigent movant would also seem to
provide a satisfactory resolution to the problem of the stage of the proceedings
at which counsel should be appointed. The principle of that standard is that
assistance of counsel should be forthcoming as soon as it appears that the
prisoner's motion is not clearly frivolous. Such a rule would provide the section 2255 movant assistance in the gathering of evidence and testimony
to substantiate his motion before the hearing as well as in the presentation
of such evidence at the hearing. It would not, however, guarantee assignment
of counsel to every prisoner who managed to file a motion.
Strict limitation upon the trial court's discretion in disallowing counsel,
should right to counsel be extended to section 2255 proceedings, raises the
practical consideration of the additional burden on the bench and bar implicit
in the provision of free legal services. Should the right to counsel be applied
retroactively, the courts may well be faced with numerous motions from those
6

s See note 6 supra, third paragraph.
In discussing the extension of right to counsel as a matter of fair criminal procedure,
notice should be taken of the argument for equal treatment of prisoners in the courts. The
Supreme Court, in the controversial case of Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956), and again
in Coppedge, indicated that it was basing the indigent's rights in criminal litigation upon the
principle of "equal treatment of all litigants before the bar." 369 U.S. at 447. If the equal
treatment doctrine were applied to right to counsel, all circuit court holdings denying counsel
to the indigent under § 2255 would be invalid unless representation for the solvent prisoner
by retained counsel were similarly denied or limited.
However, the principle of equal treatment for all litigants, carried to its logical conclusion,
proves too much. It is more reasonable to say that the Court was not advancing a dogmatic
pronouncement of equal treatment in either Griffin or Coppedge. Rather, the Court was
establishing, in both cases, certain standards of minimally fair criminal procedure. See
Allen, Griffin v. Illinois: Antecedents and Aftermath, 25 U. C. L. REv. 151 (1957). Subsequent to the Griffin decision, the Court reaffirmed the fundamental fairness test of Betts
v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942), which permitted the criminal trial of indigents, without representation by counsel, in the state courts so long as the fundamental fairness of the trial
is demonstrated. This would seem to be sufficient indication that the Court is not enforcing
the doctrine of equal treatment "to the greatest possible extent" in the field of right to
counsel. See Coppedge, 369 U.S. at 446.
66

594

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30:583

prisoners who were not granted counsel on previous motions. 67 Commentators disagree, however, as to the substantiality of the burden of free legal
aid to indigents. 68 The Supreme Court has not considered the burden a proper
counterbalance to the necessity of fairness to indigents in other federal criminal litigation, beyond the provision in Coppedge of minimum safeguards
against abusive use of free legal aid. It would not seem justifiable to refuse
counsel under section 2255 proceedings solely because of the resulting additional cost.
Ill
There remains for consideration the minority rule of the circuit courts, an
intermediate position between free allowance of counsel and appointment of
counsel according to court discretion: That a prisoner's right to counsel depends
upon the type of claim raised in his section 2255 motion. The Massachusetts
District Court in Green v. United States,69 held that when the issues raised
by the motion involve questions of fact, the prisoner is entitled to counsel.
When they involve only issues of law, appointment of counsel is not necessary.
Green has been followed in the Fourth and Fifth Circuits 7O and most recently
in the Ninth Circuit case of Dillon v. United States.71 The Second Circuit case
of United States v. Paglia,7 2 the one circuit decision susceptible of a reading
that there is a general right to counsel under section 2255, is, on its narrow
holding, also in accord with Green.73
The Green holding is patterned after the Supreme Court decision in United
States v. Hayman,74 which held that the prisoner had a right to be present
at his section 2255 hearing whenever the issues raised involve the giving of
testimony, cross-examination and the like in order to settle factual questions.75
The Hayman decision presents strong support for an argument that the pris67 Itis beyond the scope of this comment to discuss at length the feasibility of retroactive
or prospective application of the right to counsel in § 2255 proceedings. The problem is
perhaps a difficult one in view of the fact motions may be filed at any time while the prisoner
remains incarcerated. For a discussion of retroactive application offederal rulings in general,
see Note, 71 YALE L.J. 907 (1962). Particularly germane to the subject of right to counsel
is the note's discussion of Griffin v. Illinois, supra note 66, and of the effect of retroactivity
upon court administration. Note, supra, 938-40, 950-51.
68 Compare Williams, The Indigent Defendant: The Problem in the Light of Recent De-cisions,45 A.B.A.J. 174 (1959) (attorneys will be swamped and will balk), with Rann, Appointment of Counsel as a Matter of Right on Criminal Appeals, 23 ALBANY L. REV. 114,
121-22 (1959) (attorneys respond "willingly and cheerfully" to assist indigents).
69 158 F. Supp. 804 (D. Mass.), aff'd, 256 F.2d 483 (1st Cir. 1958).
70 United States v. Neims, 190 F. Supp. 677 (W.D. Va. 1960), aff'd on other grounds,
291 F.2d 390 (4th Cir. 1961); United States v. Pruitt, 121 F. Supp. 15 (S.D. Tex.), aff'd, 217
F.2d 648 (5th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 907 (1955).
71307 F.2d 445 (9th Cir. 1962).
72 190 F.2d 445 (2d Cir. 1951).
73 The case was remanded for hearing with counsel representing the prisoner, but the
issues remanded for hearing were questions of fact.
74 342 U.S. 205 (1952).
75 Id. at 222-23.
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oner should also have legal representation in the technical process of questioning witnesses and presenting testimony to establish facts that would support his claim for relief. The fact that the legally untrained prisoner is present
will hardly insure a fair hearing if he is then left to his own devices in the
calling and questioning of witnesses.
It is, however, not so obvious that the prisoner should not also be represented by counsel when his motion involves only issues of law. It will likely
be of no benefit to the fair .disposition of the motion, based on claims of law
alone, that an indigent and legally untrained prisoner is present to guide the
court's deliberations at the hearing. On the other hand, it is difficult to support
a contention that the arguments of counsel will not promote such a fair disposition, just as will the briefs and arguments of counsel on an appeal.
Even if the seemingly arbitrary distinction of fact and law issues under the
Green doctrine are ignored, it should be noted that Green again places the
indigent prisoner in the position of having to pass a preliminary test before
he is entitled to the aid of counsel.76 He must, by his own efforts, raise particular issues-that is, issues of fact-before he may have help. This preliminary test will often be more difficult to meet than one patterned after the
Coppedge rule, which would require only the raising of any non-frivolous issue
in the motion before counsel was granted.77
CONCLUSION

Circuit court decisions that deny or limit right to counsel under section
2255 proceedings leave an unwarranted inconsistency in the fabric of protection for the accused in federal criminal litigation. The holdings do not demonstrate that the prisoner is in less need of legal assistance in order fairly and
effectively to employ the statutory machinery to regain his freedom, than if
he were appealing his conviction directly. Nor do they advance significant
reasons for applying different standards to such proceedings than to direct
appeals when deciding what constitutes fair criminal procedure in the federal
courts.
Prior holdings of the Supreme Court in other contexts, and particularly in
Hayman,7 8 may indicate that as a minimum measure the federal courts ought
to adopt the Green79 holding that there is a right to counsel when the motion
raises issues of fact. However, even Green places an artificial limitation on the
extension of right to counsel in the federal courts, a limitation that can only
be justified by arbitrary distinction-drawing. It is not necessarily correct that
the courts are never justified in making arbitrary distinctions for the purpose
76 See text accompanying note 59 supra.
77 The Green test is also more difficult to meet than the test a prisoner must pass under
§ 2255 before he is granted a hearing on his motion. See note 6 supra, third paragraph.
78 United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205 (1952).

79 Green v. United States, 158 F. Supp. 804 (D. Mass.), aff'd, 256 F.2d 483 (1st Cir. 1958).
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of confining a principle of law, but it is difficult to make such a justification
where human life or liberty is involved. In any case, such a device ought to
be employed only when the principle sought to be confined is capable of
extension ad absurdum throughout a particular field of law. No such principle
seems to be involved here. To extend a general right to counsel to section 2255
proceedings would complete the process of recognizing that representation by
counsel is a necessary part of all fair criminal procedure in the federal courts.
As the logical completion of this process, the extension would open no floodgates of further extension in federal criminal litigation.
This is not to say that right to counsel under section 2255 ought to guarantee
judicial sanction and succor to the obviously frivolous motion of the indigent
prisoner who will try anything in order to get out of jail. The Supreme Court
has met the problem of abuse of the right to counsel in prisoner-initiated
appeals. In Coppedge,SO the Court prescribed a rule that at once guarantees
maximum protection, including aid of counsel, to the poor prisoner who
advances a colorably valid claim in his petition for appeal, while empowering
the courts to refuse counsel and summarily deny the petition containing conclusively invalid claims. It is submitted that the extension of the right to counsel, along with a minimum limitation like the Coppedge rule, to section 2255
proceedings would elevate these proceedings to a level of fairness consonant
with other federal criminal litigation.
80 Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438 (1962).

